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To paraphrase a verse from the Talmud, the world rests on
three pillars: peace, justice, and truth. In reality, the three are
but one.
When we deal with relations between nations and relations
between people, one would hope that the goals would be the
three pillars of peace, justice, and truth. Human history spans
some 35,000 to 39,000 years and approximately forty different
civilizations. Studies by famous historians such as Toynbee re-
veal that one constant theme emanates throughout all of these
civilizations: justice. Every civilization created a system of jus-
tice, attempted to develop a judiciary of some form or another,
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tried to balance the rights of the individual with the rights of
society, and, among other things, sought various approaches to
justice, punishment, and retribution.
Justice is endemic to human nature. I cannot be sure that
the notion of justice is embedded in us as is any other instinct
that we have developed, whether it is the instinct of survival or
otherwise. I am also sure other scientists will dispute that it is
endemic and say justice is behavioral or something that is
learned. Yet, it is extraordinary how a sense of justice perme-
ates us as individuals and as societies, how even children at a
very early age feel a sense of justice and injustice.
And yet, as we go through life, our sense of justice is eroded
rather than strengthened and honed. Perhaps it is the contin-
ual contact with a reality that seems so opposed to justice that
causes us to reconsider our original youthful expectations. This
is why each subsequent generation must come to the fore. As
the current generation's enthusiasm wanes and skepticism in-
creases, the new generation infuses the battle with its enthusi-
asm and its idealism.
Truth is seldom pure and rarely simple. When we look at
the world's three pillars - peace, justice, and truth - it is with a
sense of absoluteness. In our attempt to achieve those goals,
however, we soon realize that they are relative. Throughout the
various civilizations of the last 35,000 to 39,000 years, there-
fore, it has always been a struggle to try to find ways by which
we can circumscribe that relativity. We do this in order to avoid
being in the position that Niccolo Machiavelli described some
five centuries ago in The Prince:1 namely, that the end justifies
the means.
The notion of realpolitik emerged from the writings of
Machiavelli, from the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the works of
Metternich, and, in its latest incarnation, in Henry Kissinger
and Richard Holbrook. The foregoing all look at peace as the
art of the possible, as the art of the political compromise, as
avoiding at all costs anything that smacks of principle and any-
thing that resembles truth or approaches justice. All of the ef-
forts at political peacemaking have been shrouded in
1 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (George A. Bull trans., Penguin Books
1983).
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machinations that seem not only to shun these basic values, but
to reject them.
Henry Kissinger is perhaps a sorcerer in the field of forging
peace and has managed to achieve great success. In 1973 he
realized that if Egypt crossed the Suez Canal and defeated the
Israelis, there could never be a peace treaty between Egypt and
Israel. Together with the Israelis, therefore, Kissinger engi-
neered a crossing of the Suez in the Deversoire area by a special
unit under General Sharon. After Sharon's unit had occupied a
certain portion of Egyptian territory, Kissenger announced that
both sides had achieved victories they could claim for their re-
spective internal constituencies and that discussions about a
disengagement agreement could begin. Subsequently, each
time the concept of a peace treaty was broached, General
Sharon dissented in favor of a simple disengagement agree-
ment.
Ultimately, disengagement agreements were reached in
1974 and in 1975. Kissinger thought these disengagement
agreements would build to a crescendo over time. He was abso-
lutely right. Without having orchestrated the Israeli counterat-
tack, it would have been impossible for a defeated Israel to
make a peace treaty, and the Egyptians would have been much
more difficult to deal with had they achieved complete victory.
Kissinger's assessment, therefore, produced a positive result.
On the other hand, as a result of his involvement in the
administration of every stage of the plan with a great deal of
minutiae, Kissinger lost sight of the big picture of achieving a
lasting peace. Consequently, in 1975 and 1976, I determined
that we needed to make a qualitative jump into the area of
agreements in principle. A colleague of mine, a dear friend,
Mort Kaplan of the University of Chicago and I role-played the
negotiation of a peace treaty. Our negotiations originally con-
sisted of 13 points, but we split one point in two in recollection
of Woodrow Wilson's famous 14 points.2 With these points, we
produced a text that we proceeded to submit to the United
States and Egyptian governments.
2 See GADDIS SMITH, WOODROW WILSON'S FOURTEEN PoINTs AFTER 75 YEARs
(Carnegie Ethics & In. 993); see also http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/wwi/1918/14
points.html.
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I brought the text to the attention of then President Ford
and President Sadat, but they were not interested. During the
1976 presidential campaign, however, I met Jimmy Carter
while in Chicago. Carter saw the merit in the plan and asked
Secretary Vance to pursue it as soon as he took office. Eventu-
ally, of course, the principles were established at Camp David.
While peace was eventually established at Camp David, the
following brief vignette illustrates a hidden but all important
impetus behind the success of that peace process. The director
general of Israeli Prime Minister Begin's office was General
Tamir, who is still alive and revered as a hero. He had fought
wars for Israel since 1948 and is presently the military adviser
to President Weitzman. General Tamir was extremely effective
at Camp David, and, as a testament to his character, he gained
the complete confidence of President Sadat. It was amazing to
witness President Sadat at the negotiating table disregarding
his own generals to consult periodically with General Tamir. It
was just an extraordinary experience.
General Tamir and I still work together with a group of ex-
perts on the Middle East. During one of those meetings, we
were talking, and General Tamir said that people will never re-
alize that one of the key ingredients in bringing about peace is
something that is totally unknown. When I inquired as to what
it was, he stated that over the years Israel has had a lot of
Egyptian prisoners and Egypt, as well, has had a lot of Israeli
prisoners. Notwithstanding, he went on to note that there has
never been an incident where either an Egyptian or an Israeli
prisoner was killed or tortured. He said that one of the biggest
stumbling blocks to peace with Syria is that six Israeli airmen
were killed in 1973.
It struck me that of all of the examples I could ever think of
to demonstrate the impact of humanitarian law on peace, this
one is a simple one of something that is totally invisible. The
fact that two countries at war with one another could fight each
other honorably and follow the rules of the game by not violat-
ing international humanitarian law did more to achieve the re-
sulting peace than anything else.
In 1956, I had an important experience just after 1 returned
to Cairo from the front at the Suez Canal Zone, where I had
been wounded. One evening when I was serving as duty officer
[Vol. 12:213
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at a camp in the center of Cairo, I heard a great deal of commo-
tion. In response to this commotion, I asked some people what
had occurred. They replied that an Israeli plane had been shot
down and that the pilot had parachuted from the plane. My
first instinct was to gather the ten soldiers on night guard duty
with me. We each grabbed the first weapon we could find, and
we rushed to protect the pilot from the mob. When I related
this incident to General Tamir, he said that this is the type of
thing that creates a lasting impact in the minds of people. In
the final analysis, then, when peace is made, it is not made on a
piece of paper but between people. Once people can relate to
one another as human beings, they are capable of transcending
all political difficulties.
I now return to the machinations involved in political
peacemaking. While the merits of the Kissinger approach are
evident, unfortunately this is not true of the sorcerer's appren-
tice approach, Richard Holbrook. During his time in the former
Yugoslavia, Holbrook came to the conclusion that there were
some things that could not be accomplished through negotia-
tions, but only outside the negotiations. For example, there is
an area in Croatia known as the Krajinas. Serbs historically
occupied the Krajinas. The Serbs moved there subsequent to
their defeat at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. By the mid-1990s,
there were 200,000 Serbs living in the Krajinas. The Croatian
government, however, wanted the Serbs out and the Krajinas
returned to Croatian control.
At the same time, the Bosnian Serbs wanted to enlarge a
corridor stretching from Srebrenica to Brcko in the northern-
most section of Bosnia, along the Drina River. Basically, this
corridor would connect the Serb-inhabited areas of Bosnia with
Serbia proper. The corridor was part of the greater Serbian
plan.
Holbrook, however, realized that achieving these ends
through a public settlement or negotiation would be difficult.
Instead, therefore, he arranged for the Croatian army to be re-
trained by a major U.S. corporation headed by a former secre-
tary of defense. With the agreement of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), former U.S. military personnel
trained them with weapons supplied by Germany. The weap-
ons were all East German, and the new unified Germany did
20001
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not need them. In addition, the weapons were of the same
make as those made throughout the former Yugoslavia. The
new Croatian army became strong, well-disciplined, well-organ-
ized, and eventually moved on to the Krajinas. The American
ambassador rode behind the reconnaissance forces to ensure
that nothing worse than removal would happen to the Serbs in
the region. Croatian control of the Krajinas, therefore, became
the new reality, irrespective of issues of justice or of the rights
of the people involved.
The same type of operation was supposed to occur in the
Srebrenica-Brcko corridor. Unfortunately, however, Holbrook
failed to give credence to my negative assessment of General
Radtko Mladic, and this butcher was given the task of clearing
the corridor. While Mladic accumulated approximately 4,000
troops and moved on the corridor, the French president told the
local French commander, General Jean-Vie, not to request any
NATO strikes. When Mladic moved in, therefore, there were
about 500 Dutch soldiers with small sidearm weapons who were
easily overtaken. In total, 7,000 men were killed and thrown in
a field.
The next day, Ambassador Madeleine Albright showed sat-
ellite imagery of that field and those corpses to the United Na-
tion's Security Council (Security Council). During my two years
as chairman of the Security Council's commission to investigate
the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, I was never given the
benefit of a single satellite photo. On that occasion, however,
the satellite photo promptly surfaced. Needless to say, the day
after the photo was shown to the Security Council, the field was
bulldozed. Only a few remains were left behind.
Holbrook's treatment of the former Yugoslavia led to the
Dayton agreements3 and, eventually, to the de facto impunity of
Milosevic, Mladic, and Karadzic. Do agreements that grant im-
punity to the likes of these men achieve the goals of peace, jus-
tice, or truth? Although it may be naive and idealistic of me, I
think that although it may be difficult to deal with the truth at
times, the truth has a way of enduring longer than half-truths
and misrepresentations found in political settlement
agreements.
3 Dayton Peace Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Nov. 10, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170.
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Historically, there have been struggles within each society
between those who are in power and those who are disen-
franchised or who are without power. We see these struggles
constantly being fought on the battlefield of justice, and the
same sorts of struggles occur on the international level.
Before pursuing this line of thought further, allow me to
make an observation about the evolution of international hu-
manitarian law. Perhaps one of the early manifestations of this
body of law comes in the form of a sixth century B.C. book enti-
tled The Art of War,4 by the Chinese writer Sun-Tzu. Now, Sun-
Tzu obviously did not write that book from the perspective of
humanism, but it is uncanny how neatly the proscriptions and
prescriptions contained in the book fall within the category of
humanitarian law. For example, Sun-Tzu proscribed the killing
of prisoners, women, children, and the elderly, and the destruc-
tion of places of worship. He also prescribed respect for those
who seek sanctuary and refuge in places of worship. According
to Sun-Tzu, if a military leader were to follow these proscrip-
tions and prescriptions, he would be a more successful con-
queror, and the conquests undertaken would be less painful and
less costly. The Art of War can be described as an early cost-
benefit analysis of the effects of humanist thinking and conduct.
Interestingly, there also exists an Indian book called
Mano's Matte, or Book of Mano, that was published almost a
century and a half after The Art of War. China was extremely
insular at the time, and there is no indication at all of the mi-
gration of ideas from China to India during that period. The
building of the Great Wall, which was intended not only to keep
invaders from entering China, but also to keep people and ideas
from leaving China, evidences this Chinese insularity. Never-
theless, despite the fact that the Chinese had absolutely no in-
tention of exporting their ideas, in the Book of Mano we find the
same basic proscriptions and prescriptions addressed by Sun-
Tzu.
Furthermore, much to my surprise, I learned that the same
types of proscriptions have also been found in fourth century
B.C.. Mayan remnants in North America and in the Caliph of
Islam's admonitions to his troops at the beginning of the sev-
4 SuN-Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (Thomas Cleary trans., Shambhala Publications
1991).
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enth century A.D.. Again, there is no evidence of the migration
of ideas between and among these societies and the societies in
which The Art of War and the Book of Mano were written. The
fact that the same or very similar proscriptions and prescrip-
tions appear in the discrete societies of the sixth century B.C.
Chinese, the fifth century B.C. Indians, the fourth century B.C.
Mayans, and the seventh century A.D. Muslims indicates that
there are certain shared humanistic values that seem to tran-
scend religious or philosophic differences.
During the period of the Crusades and the Fourth Lateran
Council, a new proscription emerged. It was decided that the
Crusaders would no longer use the crossbow because it was a
weapon that caused unnecessary pain and suffering. Amaz-
ingly, as an aside, the same language was used in the 1907
Hague Regulation of Armed Conflict. 5 At any rate, the proscrip-
tion against the use of the crossbow was concomitant with the
development of the concept of chivalry, a humanist concept that
migrated along the paths of the Crusades. A clear example of
this migration can be seen in the works of canonist writers like
Suarez and Ayala. While Suarez and Ayala wrote proscriptions
for the Spanish Army that were inspired primarily by Aristotle,
these proscriptions also make reference to the conduct of the
Crusades.
The period of the Crusades, however, witnessed not only
the migration of humanist ideas, but also the first wide-scale
transformation of those ideas into practice. For example, when
Salahuddin defeated the French ruler Louis IX, he confined him
to a nice home and permitted him to communicate via letters
with people in France. This manner of treating a prisoner of
war, albeit not an ordinary prisoner of war, is demonstrative of
the transformation of humanist ideas into practical interna-
tional law.
Several centuries later, Napoleon abandoned any pretense
of following international law. While a legend, there has proba-
bly been no greater barbarian at war than Napoleon. Napoleon,
after all, violated just about every rule regarding armed con-
flict. Ironically, however, Napoleon's conduct was responsible
for pushing international humanitarian law to a higher level.
5 Convention Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV),
Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 631.
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After his defeat, at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, an effort was
made to do more than simply restore peace between nations and
divide territory.6 The Congress of Vienna, for example, ad-
dressed the protection of cultural property and the elimination
of slavery. Such ideals of justice emerged as the foundation of a
peace between individuals, not just a cessation of hostilities be-
tween nations.
The continuing development of ideals of justice after the
Congress of Vienna is represented in the convening of the
Hague Conference of 1899, 7 in the Conference's codification of
the regulation of armed conflict, and in the 1907 amendment to
this regulation.8 Similar goals were pursued at the Geneva
Conventions of 1864,9 1929,10 1949,11 and 1977.12 Between the
Hague and Geneva, there are 39 different conventions that deal
with the elimination, prohibition, and/or criminalization of a va-
riety of weapons.
Unfortunately, however, the degree of enforceability of
these weapons-related conventions is an open question. Even
where large numbers of states have ratified the conventions,
and even where the conventions have been put into practice, it
is not clear whether the conventions rise to the level of custom-
ary international law. The recent land mines convention pro-
vides a significant example of the problems relating to
enforceability.' 3 Despite the fact that more than 120 countries
have subscribed to the land mines convention, the United
6 See generally The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, 64
Consol. T.S. 453 (Fr.).
7 The First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1899, reprinted in 1
AM. J. INT'L. L. 1, 106 (supp. 1908).
8 The First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1907, reprinted in 2
AM. J. INTL. L. 1, 106 (supp. 1908).
9 Convention [No. III] for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Princi-
ples of the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, 1
Bevans 263.
10 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929,
47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
11 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146.
12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
13 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production &
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mine & on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, reprinted
in 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997).
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States rejects it and does not consider it to be part of customary
international law.
What exists then, is a series of circles. One circle is the
intellectual circle, the circle of the evolution of ideas, ideas that
derive from social values predicated on philosophic and relig-
ious values. That circle develops and expands over the course of
time, but it is only capable of influencing other circles. The sec-
ond circle is the circle of the evolution of international instru-
ments, instruments from which we may derive proscriptive and
prescriptive norms. The elements of enforcement of these
norms are very sparse, but they begin to develop the body of
binding legal obligation. The third circle is the circle of enforce-
ment. History teaches us that proscriptions and prescriptions
are largely meaningless in the absence of the effective, fair, and
impartial enforcement and administration of justice. Neverthe-
less, while we have developed enforcement models at the na-
tional levels, for many reasons we have been reluctant to
develop such models at the international level.
One such reason may be the intricate relationship between
the administration of justice and notions of national sover-
eignty. Transcending the psychological attachment to national
sovereignty in favor of an international system of enforcement
may be too much for many to bear. Another reason for the fail-
ure to develop international enforcement models may be that
those, like myself, who work in the field of criminal justice are
not broad-minded or open-minded enough to make the leap
from the national model to the globalization of justice.
Enforcement is a problem for international criminal law in
general, but particularly so in the context of crimes that involve
or affect a state or states. Enforcement of such crimes does not
occur in a vacuum. On the contrary, in such cases, there is
likely to exist a strong political dimension that must be taken
into consideration. For example, simply by supporting the en-
forcement of international criminal law, one state may grant
another a degree of political legitimacy. This explains why
Israel has never recognized the applicability of the Geneva Con-
ventions 14 to the Palestinians. While Israel abides by the terms
14 See Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded & Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick & Ship-
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of the Conventions, it does not wish to acknowledge that the
Conventions apply to the Palestinians because it believes such
acknowledgement would give the Palestinian's nation-building
effort increased political status. The Israel-Palestine situation
is representative of the dilemma inherent in attempting to en-
force international humanitarian law in a neutral manner bind-
ing on all states when each state has its own political priorities.
The same dilemma has frustrated efforts to reach an inter-
national agreement in regards to terrorism. The problem is
that what some countries deem to be terrorist activity is not so
deemed by others. Of course, this problem can be addressed by
eliminating the label of terrorism from the efforts to curtail cer-
tain types of conduct. If the label of terrorism is avoided, per-
haps an agreement can be reached that will proscribe the
killing of women and children irrespective of the perceived legit-
imacy of the goals sought to be achieved by such acts.
The ultimate question, then, is how to develop value neu-
tral rules that can be enforced upon all sides. Ideally, for pure
enforcement purposes, one might wish to develop a suprana-
tional system of justice, but such a concept remains internation-
ally unacceptable. The next best choice is an international
system accepted by consent of the states. If a system is based
on consent of the states, however, it will be only as strong as the
states wish it to be. An additional problem with such an inter-
national system is the effect of a weak member. If one state's
enforcement of the agreed international norms is sufficiently
weak that it will become a state of refuge for international
criminals, that state will be the Achilles heel of the interna-
tional system.
Thus, we are now in the stage of attempting to develop an
international criminal court that will be international rather
than supranational, that will be dependent upon states, and
wrecked Members of the Forces at Sea, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85; Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. at
3328, 75 U.N.T.S. at 146; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516. See also Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1391; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 &
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1997 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442.
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that will be complementary. There is a French word, compl-
mentaritg, that does not exist in English, but which has been
translated into English as "complementarity." This underlying
principle creates the impression, or the feeling, of national sys-
tems that have an extra gear that can be shifted into a new
gear, which constitute the international system. This impres-
sion, however, is just an illusion. There are two separate
gearboxes.
I wish the systems were better connected, so that the Inter-
national Criminal Court could be a true extension of national
criminal jurisdiction, with the equivalent of a change of venue
motion allowing some national cases to be brought before the
International Criminal Court, but this is not at all the case.
That is how it must be at this stage. After all, each historic
period witnesses the development of certain institutions, and
these institutions become the bases and foundations for the
next generation of institutions; and sometimes the weaknesses
of one generation are cured by the next. Whenever I feel partic-
ularly discouraged, I look to my good friend Ben Ferencz, a for-
mer Nuremberg prosecutor, and say to myself, "I'll pick up from
where he left off." Because if he had the fortitude to carry it
forward for so many years, and if he is still in great spirits and
full of enthusiasm, then I will do my share before passing it on
to my students, and then they will do their share before finding
someone else to carry on. In a sense, then, that is the evolution-
ary process with which we are dealing.
What I am attempting to convey in what is an absolute
hodgepodge of information and ideas is that we have multiple
parallel tracks. On one track, we have the track of law, legal
institutions, the evolutions of norms, the strengthening of
norms, the development of new institutions, the strengthening
of institutions, and so on and so forth. On the other track is
what we do not frequently see, the track of realpolitik.
Let me give you some additional examples to illustrate the
point. There were twenty-four people indicted at Nuremberg
and twenty-two that stood trial.15 In the subsequent American,
British, Russian, and French proceedings, another 50,000 peo-
15 See generally Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10: Nuremberg, October 1946-1949 (U.S.
Government Printing Office 1994).
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ple were tried. In the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur
issued a proclamation establishing another international mili-
tary tribunal patterned after the one in Nuremberg. The origi-
nal Nuremberg tribunal was a product of the London Treaty of
August 8, 1945,16 which was signed by four countries and ac-
ceded to by nineteen others. In the Far East, on the other hand,
the tribunal's foundation rested on General MacArthur's issu-
ance of a proclamation and appointment of judges. After the
proceedings began, twenty-eight people were indicted, and the
Allies proceeded to prosecute over 5,700 people in various areas.
The first major trials in Tokyo were concluded by 1947, and the
subsequent trials that continued in various parts of Asia were
conducted principally by the Americans, the British, the Aus-
tralians, the New Zealanders, the French, the Dutch, and the
Chinese.
In 1951, the Japanese reacted against having their people
jailed in all of these different places. These prisoners were,
therefore, brought back to prison in central Tokyo. In 1953, the
United States and Japan signed a peace treaty in San Fran-
cisco. 17 By the end of that year, not a single Japanese prisoner
of war who had been convicted of war crimes remained in
prison. Of the more than 15,000 persons sentenced to many
years of imprisonment for war crimes, not one remained in
prison by the end of 1953. In 1954, subsequent to new elections,
a Japanese cabinet was formed that included two persons who
had been tried and convicted at the Tokyo trials, the prime min-
ister and the foreign minister.
You might recall that when MacArthur entered Tokyo, Em-
peror Hirohito was still in his palace. You might further recall
that Emperor Hirohito was never charged with a crime of ag-
gression, despite the fact that Japan could never have gone to
war had the emperor so much as lifted his finger against it.
Moreover, there was not a single person who was indicted or
16 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
17 Treaty of Peace, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S. - Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No.
2490; see also Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S. -
Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2065.
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prosecuted for what is widely known as the "Rape of
Nanking."'
MacArthur viewed these trials as a manner of achieving
control over the occupied territories. To the extent that justice
could be manipulated, it was. General Yamashita was con-
demned in the Philippines not for crimes of which he had abso-
lutely no knowledge, but because MacArthur wanted to make
an example of him. General Yamashita was convicted on the
grounds that a commanding officer bears criminal responsibil-
ity for what he should know about what his troops might do.
General Yamashita had issued orders to his troops prohibiting
crimes against civilians, and he had no actual knowledge of any
such crimes being committed. Nevertheless, MacArthur knew
that he needed General Yamashita as an example, just as he
knew that he needed to keep Emperor Hirohito in his palace
behind the moat if MacArthur was to control and rule Japan.
Justice was used by MacArthur as an illusion in true
Potemkin fashion. Just as the Russian General Potemkin built
villages in Crimea along the river so that Catherine the Great
would have the impression that the Crimean peasants were
well-fed, well-nourished, and satisfied, so too did the prosecu-
tions in the Far East give the impression that justice was being
done.
In fact, what we witnessed in the Far East is what might be
termed as Potemkin international criminal justice. We are see-
ing a little bit of criminal justice, a little bit of realism on occa-
sion, and a few effective trials. Certainly, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' 9 has produced
some very effective prosecutions, and there have been some suc-
cessful prosecutions in the Rwanda tribunal.20 While we must
recognize the great merits of these accomplishments, we must
not forget that there is much left to be accomplished. I say this
because major perpetrators remain at large, and will probably
18 See THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (Nov. 1948), reprinted in 2 THE LAW OF
WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1060-61 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
19 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res 827, UN SCOR 4 8th Sess., 3 2 17th mtg., U.N. doc. S/RES/827, reprinted in
32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993).
20 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
UN SCOR 4 9" Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. doc S/RES/955, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1598
(1994).
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continue to remain at large for so long as they serve a political
purpose. Moreover, some 90,000 violators await a domestic
prosecution in Rwanda. Ultimately, we must deal with this ten-
sion between the attempt to develop international criminal jus-
tice in its own right, and the realpolitik view of international
criminal justice as a useful tool in the achievement of desired
political results.
Perhaps an additional example is the indictment of
Milosevic by the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer-Yugoslavia. Shortly after Serb forces committed terrible
crimes in Kosovo and shortly after approximately 800,000 peo-
ple were ethnically cleansed, the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia indicted Milosevic. Milosevic,
however, was never indicted for any crimes committed from
1991 to 1995 in Bosnia or in Croatia. Yet, there is ample evi-
dence that he ordered some of those crimes, or, at the very least,
that he should be held accountable for some of those crimes
under the standard of command responsibility. The indictment,
then, is not based on all of the crimes he committed. It is a very
narrowly drafted indictment that deals with the killing of
thirty-five people in a particular village, alleging that Milosevic
himself gave the order.
Now, I submit to you that there is no way that tribunal is
ever going to be able to prove that Milosevic gave that order. Of
course, there are the rumors that the United States will assist
the prosecution by providing satellite pictures and that the De-
fense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will provide information. Can
anyone in his wildest imagination think that a DIA expert is
going to testify to having had a satellite in place on the fateful
day, that the satellite took this image of the site, that the DIA
enhanced the image, and that the DIA preserved the image
with a proper chain of evidence? Or, does anyone believe that
someone from the DIA is going to testify to how the agency cap-
tured a telephone conversation between Milosevic and one of his
generals in which Milosevic gave the kill order? It is not likely.
So, the question arises: Why was the indictment issued? It
was issued for two reasons. One, it indicated to Milosevic that
while he was given a pass because he signed Dayton,21 he was
21 Dayton Peace Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Nov. 10, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170.
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not going to get away with the killings. Two, in the form of an
order the tribunal issued the next day for the discovery of as-
sets, Milosevic was informed that he would be hit where it hurt.
The U.S. government is aware of what I discovered in 1993, that
Milosevic and his entourage have assets valued at hundreds of
millions of dollars in foreign accounts, and the message to
Milosevic was: "You won't always be in power. One day, you
will need this money, and we know where it is. So, be a good
boy." At any rate, the next day assurances were given, Serb
troops were pulled out, NATO troops went in, no body bags were
returned, and everybody was happy.
Haiti provides another recent example. President Clinton
declares to the United States people that the regime of General
Cedras is the worst in the world and that the regime has com-
mitted all the worst possible crimes. President Clinton then
proceeds to send General Colin Powell to Haiti, and General
Powell makes a deal with Cedras. The deal is that Cedras will
go to Panama where he will receive a villa, a lump sum pay-
ment, and a monthly check. General Powell returns to the
United States and declares Cedras to be an honorable general.
Cedras leaves Haiti with full military honors to live a quiet non-
extraditable life in Panama.
Adding to the unreality of the Haiti scenario is the fact that
General Manuel Noriega brokered the deal from prison. Gen-
eral Noriega, by the way, is the only federal prisoner I know of
who receives his four-star military uniform starched each day.
General Noriega also has a two-room suite for a cell with pri-
vate furniture in the bedroom, and he has access to a phone and
a fax machine. Just to complete the irony, General Noriega is
considered a prisoner of war.
At stake in the deal to remove Cedras was not justice for
the Haitian people. At stake was not the issue of whether or not
Cedras' regime was a terrible one. At stake was not the issue of
Cedras' victims. What was at stake was politics. President
Clinton simply could not afford to have body bags with United
States soldiers being shipped back from Haiti, and, therefore,
President Clinton authorized a deal that would avoid the possi-
bility of such an event.
Whether such a deal is a good or a bad thing is difficult to
determine. The fact that a deal was reached to remove Cedras
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from Haiti does at least represent some intervention. The deal
did not redress the wrongs of the past, but it may prevent those
of the future. Similarly, it is difficult to describe as entirely
wrong the decision to give Milosevic a pass to sign the Dayton
agreement. 22 After all, threatening him with prosecution might
have caused another 10,000 or 20,000 people to be killed.
The choices are not easy. There is real tension between the
two goals of achieving political solutions and achieving higher
values. And, just as there is a checks and balances system in
place in the United States, there is an informal checks and bal-
ances system at the international level. This informal system
consists of those few people who will continue to keep the pres-
sure on governments, that will make it difficult for governments
to make the most egregious or outrageous deals, that will de-
nounce governments when necessary, and that will praise gov-
ernments when they act honorably and in accordance with
international humanist principles. These few people will en-
sure a sense of continuity and progress. While progress may be
slow, the evolution of humankind and the history of law teaches
us that progress has always been slow and painstaking.
It is my hope that in this age of globalization, when more
people are studying law than ever, that these prospective law-
yers will be the true legions of justice. No matter how limited
their efforts and no matter how small their voices may be, I
think these prospective lawyers will add a strong voice to what I
call "international civil society," and I think international civil
society is the necessary countervailing force to the forces of cyn-
icism and realpolitik. The presence of an international civil so-
ciety makes it more difficult for the forces of cynicism and
realpolitik to achieve their ultimate goals of compromising
justice.
I am convinced that there can truly be no peace without
justice; and, certainly, there can be no justice without truth.
Difficult as it may be, we should be dedicated to the pursuit of
those goals. We should attempt to approximate them as best we
can and to dedicate some of our efforts to preventing the cynics,
the skeptics, and the realpolitician from compromising justice.
If we fail to do so, we are condemned to repeat our mistakes.
22 See id.
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Perhaps, in closing I will recount a difficult story to hear,
but one that I carry like one carries a cross on his shoulder. The
events of this story occurred in 1993. We were in the midst of
conducting the largest rape investigation in history. Initial
fruits of the investigation were the Foca rapes that are now be-
ing prosecuted in the Yugoslavian tribunal. 23 I had thirty-three
women volunteering in this investigation, and these women
were divided into eleven teams. Each team consisted of a prose-
cutor, a psychiatrist, and an interpreter. They traveled
throughout the country with lists of witnesses. The teams in-
terviewed a total of 223 rape victims.
We took great pains to protect the identity of these victims
and to protect the integrity of the impending prosecutions. In
order to avoid the potential danger of prior inconsistent state-
ments that defense attorneys could use against the victims, the
prosecutor for each team would take notes, in her own words, of
each victim interview, and then report to me in writing. The
only written materials created would therefore be deemed attor-
ney work-product and undiscoverable.
One of my prosecutors was a Crown prosecutor from Ca-
nada with nine years of experience in violent crimes. She came
to me in tears one day and said that she had to leave. She said
that she had to drop the job because she could not take it any-
more. When I asked her what had happened, she explained
that a man had come to see her that day. The man was on
crutches, and he looked as if he could have been sixty and
eighty years old and aged beyond repair, but in actuality he was
probably in his forties. He said he was a soccer player from the
Croatian neighborhood of Sarajevo, but he had stopped playing
soccer in his early thirties when he met the Serb widow of a
Muslim man. He fell in love with her, married her, and adopted
her two lovely daughters. It was as if they were his own chil-
dren. His wife had a nice apartment on the Serb side of town so
they moved in together there. To make a living they opened a
little caf6 in the neighborhood. They decorated the caf6 with
soccer motifs, and as he was partial to the Croatian soccer team
on the other side of town, he would often have lively discussions
23 See e.g., The Prosecution of the Tribunal Against Gagovcic & Others (June
26, 1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/gagovcic.htm.
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with the Serb youths who would come and patronize his
business.
Then the war came. One day thereafter, a number of young
hooligans who were ostensibly militia volunteers came into the
caf6 with weapons. They destroyed the place and then took the
man to their station post. They tied him up, threw him on the
ground, and broke both of his legs with their rifle butts. The
man's wife and daughters were then brought into the station
post. The wife was told that unless she did whatever the men
directed her to do by the five men who were there, her twelve
year-old daughter and her fourteen year-old daughter would be
raped. The man's wife could not allow this to happen to her
children, so she did a striptease and was forced to perform all
sorts of horrible acts before being raped in every possible way
by the five men. And then, totally unexpectedly, the man's wife
was turned to face he and his daughters, and one of the men slit
her throat and threw her on the floor to wither and slowly die as
her blood drained out.
The men then jumped the two little girls, raped them, and
slit their throats as well. In an act of ultimate cruelty, the man
was thrown into the street with his broken legs and told to live
so that he could remember what he had seen, and so that he
could tell others what would be done to people like him.
The man then explained to my prosecutor that he had lived
for the moment that he could tell somebody the story. He said,
"I want justice." The next day, he committed suicide.
No books or theories will ever be as poignant as this partic-
ular story. Here is a victim who wanted justice. Here is a vic-
tim who was dehumanized and wanted justice. Here is a victim
who was dehumanized and wanted justice from the United Na-
tions and from the world. I submit to you that we owe justice to
this victim and to the victims that we do not know. We owe
justice to victims all over the world, justice that prevents these
occurrences, justice that deters people. We also owe it to our-
selves because if we forget that obligation we have to those un-
known victims, we also forget who we are as human beings.
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